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Are loan guarantees effective? The case of mexican government banks editor invitado Pablo Cotler

Por: Colaborador(es): Tipo de material: TextoTextoIdioma: Inglés Series Financial inclusion in Latin AmericaDetalles de publicación: México CISS UIA 2009Descripción: 19-44 il. 22 cmISSN:
  • 1870-2953
Tema(s): Clasificación CDD:
  • REV WSP No.8
Recursos en línea: En: Conferencia Interamericana de Seguridad Social Well-being and social policyResumen: Mexican Government’s Banks offer loan guarantees to private banks in order to spur credit directed to non-financial small and medium sized firms and this policy is examined here. Application of representative data to the comparative static analysis of the guarantee-use decision suggests that these schemes, as currently designed, are justifiable from an economic viewpoint. However, there is some evidence of inefficiency and ineffectiveness about the way these guarantee programs operate. Marginal take-up is plausibly explained only by the benefits perceived by private bankers.
Tipo de ítem: Artículo de revista
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Título en español: ¿Son efectivas las garantías de crédito? El caso de los bancos del gobierno mexicano.

Bibliografía p. 43-44

Mexican Government’s Banks offer loan guarantees to private banks in order to spur credit directed to non-financial small and medium sized firms and this policy is examined here. Application of representative data to the comparative static analysis of the guarantee-use decision suggests that these schemes, as currently designed, are justifiable from an economic viewpoint. However, there is some evidence of inefficiency and ineffectiveness about the way these guarantee programs operate. Marginal take-up is plausibly explained only by the benefits perceived by private bankers.

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